He's Watching You Propaganda Poster Art Wwii German Soldier Tee

"HE'S WATCHING YOU"
Just another WW2 German soldier on the march in this propaganda poster t shirt.

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The Battle of Britain (German: Luftschlacht um England or Luftschlacht um Großbritannien) is the name given to the air crusade waged by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) against the United Kingdom during the summer and autumn of 1940. The aim of the campaign was to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), especially Fighter Command. The name derives from a famous speech delivered by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons: "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin..." The Battle of Britain was the first primary campaign to be fought entirely by air forces, and was also the largest and most sustained aerial bombing warto that date. From July 1940 coastal shipping convoys and shipping centers, such as Portsmouth, were the main targets; one month later the Luftwaffe shifted its attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure. As the combat progressed the Luftwaffe also targeted aircraft factories and ground infrastructure.

Eventually the Luftwaffe resorted to attacking areas of political significance and using terror bombing tactics. The failure of Germany to achieve its objectives of destroying Britain's air defenses, or forcing Britain to negotiate an armistice or an outright surrender, is considered its first major defeat and one of the paramount turning points in the war. If Germany had gained air superiority with the Luftwaffe, Adolf Hitler might have launched Operation Sea Lion, an amphibious and airborne invasion of Britain. The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Messerschmitt Bf 110C squared off against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was 10 to 30 mph faster than the Hurricane, depending on altitude. In September 1940 the more powerful Mk IIa series 1 Hurricanes started entering service although only in small numbers. This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph, some 25 to 30 mph faster than the Mk I. The performance of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as a surprise to the Jagdwaffe, although the German pilots retained a strong belief that the 109 was the superior fighter. However, the Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than either the Hurricane or the Spitfire.

The two British fighters were equipped with eight Browning 303 machine guns, while most Bf 109Es had two machine guns and two wing cannons. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E and the Spitfire were superior to each other in key areas; for instance, at some altitudes, the Bf 109 could out-climb the British fighter. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The Spitfire Story: ...the differences between the Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by tactical considerations: which side had seen the other first, had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining. The Bf 109 was also used as a fighter-bomber—the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb beneath the fuselage. The Messerschmitt Bf 109, unlike the Stuka, could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its ordnance. At the start of the encounter, the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. Although the Messerschmitt 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the Spitfire, its lack of maneuverability and acceleration meant that it was a failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August, 13 and 30 aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire Gruppe, and the type's worst losses during the campaign. This trend continued with a further eight and 15 lost on 16 and 17 August. Göring ordered the Bf 110 units to operate "where the range of the single-engined machines were not sufficient". The most successful role of the Messerschmitt Bf 110 during the battle was as a Schnellbomber (fast bomber).

The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to bomb the target and escaped at high speed.One unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, proved that the Messerschmitt Bf 110 could be used to good effect in attacking small or "pinpoint" targets. The RAF's Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over Dunkirk because of its resemblance to the Hurricane; Luftwaffe fighters attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret.

However, during the Battle of Britain, this single-engine two-seater proved to be hopelessly outclassed. For various reasons, the Defiant lacked any form of forward firing armament and the heavy turret meant that it could not out-run or out-maneuver either the Bf 109 or the Bf 110. By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft was withdrawn from daylight service. There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these aircraft (along with the Fairey Battles in RAF Bomber Command) operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlin engines to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.The Luftwaffe's four primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing, and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka for diving attacks. The Heinkel He 111 was used in greater numbers than the others during the conflict and is better known, partly due to its distinctive wing shape. Each level bomber also had a few reconnaissance versions that were used during the battle. Although successful in previous Luftwaffe engagements, the Stuka suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain, particularly on 18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to Spitfire fighter interception after the dive bombing. As a result of the losses and limited payload and range, Ju87 Stuka units were largely removed from operations over England and concentrated on shipping instead until they were re-deployed to the Eastern Front in 1941. The Ju87 Stuka dive bombers returned on occasion, such as on the 13 September attack on Tangmere airfield. The remaining three bomber types differed in their capabilities; the Heinkel 111 was the slowest, the Ju 88, once its mainly externally carried bomb load was dropped, was the fastest, and the Do 17 had the smallest bomb load. All three bomber types suffered heavy losses from British fighters, but the Ju 88 disproportionately so. Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more frequent, all three were used. However, due to its reduced bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He 111 and Ju 88 for this purpose. On the British side, three bombers were mostly used on night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centers; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He 111. The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the continent by day and by night, while the Battle was rarely used on operations. Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude. By summer 1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF for approximately 5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers. However, the problem of pilot shortage was self-inflicted, due to inefficiencies in training and assignment. With aircraft production running at 300 each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same period. In addition, more pilots were allotted to squadrons than there were aircraft.Another problem was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada and in Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties. For these reasons, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of experienced pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Commander of Fighter Command. Drawing from regular RAF forces and the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered high casualty rates. Due mostly to more productive training, the Luftwaffe could muster a larger number (1,450) of more experienced fighter pilots. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery and instructions in tactics suited for fighter-versus-fighter combat. Luftwaffe training manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favor.