"Celebrate Diversity" with Luftwaffe aircraft. All the usual suspects of the German Luftwaffe, Messerschmitt Bf109, Me262 Jet Fighter, Henkel, Ju87 Stuka, Focke Wolf, Horten 229 jet flying wing...all ready for a Blitzkrieg on your t shirt.
-
Brand new...professionally screen printed or DTG...NOT an iron-on transfer...
-
GILDAN ULTRA COTTON brand used for men's tees, 100% pre-shrunk cotton...click here to check reviews.
-
ANVIL 978 brand used for ladies tees, 100% pre-shrunk cotton...click here to check reviews.
-
combined shipping for each additional only $1.00 ea...
FREE SHIPPING...when you order ANY 3 or more...U.S. only.
|
MENS SIZES |
S |
M |
L |
XL |
2XL |
3XL |
|
WIDTH INCHES |
18 |
20 |
22 |
24 |
26 |
28 |
|
LENGTH INCHES |
28 |
29 |
30 |
31 |
32 |
33 |
|
LADIES SIZES |
S |
M |
L |
XL |
2XL |
|
WIDTH INCHES |
18 |
20 |
22 |
24 |
26 |
|
LENGTH INCHES |
25.5 |
26.5 |
27.5 |
28.5 |
30 |
MESSERSCHMITT BF-109
The fighter aircraft needed to have a top speed of 400 km/h (250 mph) at 6,000 m (19,690 ft) which it could maintain for 20 minutes, while staying in the air for a total of 90 minutes. The critical altitude of 6,000 meters was to be reached in no more than 17 minutes, and the fighter aircraft was to have an operational ceiling of 10,000 meters. Power was to be provided by the recent Junkers Jumo 210 engine of about 522 kW (700 hp). It was to be armed with either a single high-performance 20 mm MG C 30 cannon firing through the engine shaft or, alternatively, either two engine cowl-mounted 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns, or one lightweight, engine-mounted 20 mm MG FF cannon with two 7.92 mm MG 17s. One other specification was that the aircraft needed to keep wing loading below 100 kg/m2. The performance was to be evaluated based on the fighter aircraft's level speed, rate of climb, and maneuverability, in that order. In fact, the R-III specifications were not truly devised by the T-Amt; in early-1933, both Heinkel and Arado had sent in privately funded layout s for a monoplane aircraft, and the T-Amt simply gathered the best features from both and delivered them back out again, adding Focke-Wulf to the invitation to tender. It has been suggested that Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (BFW) was principally not invited to participate in the competition due to personal animosity between Willy Messerschmitt and RLM director Erhard Milch; however, recent research by
Willy Radinger and Walter Shick indicates that this may not have been the case, as all three competing companies—Arado, Heinkel and the BFW—received the development contract for the L.A. 1432/33 requirements at the same time in February 1934. A fourth company, Focke-Wulf, received a copy of the development contract only in September 1939.The power plant was to be the Junkers Jumo 210, but the proviso was made that it would be interchangeable with the more powerful, but less developed Daimler-Benz DB 600 power plant. Each was asked to deliver three prototypes to be delivered for head-to-head testing in late 1934.After Luftwaffe acceptance trials were finished at Rechlin, the prototypes were transferred to Travemünde for the head-to-head portion of the contest. The aircraft which participated in the trials were the Arado Ar 80 V3, the Focke-Wulf Fw 159 V3, the Heinkel He 112 V4 and the Bf 109 V2. The He 112 arrived first, in early February 1936, and the rest of the prototypes had all arrived by the beginning of March.Because most of the fighter pilots of the
Luftwaffe were used to biplanes with open cockpits, low wing loading, light g-forces and easy handling, they were very critical of the Bf 109 at first. However, it soon became one of the front runners in the contest, as the Arado and Focke-Wulf entries, which were intended as "back-up" programmes to safeguard against failure of the two favorites, proved to be completely outclassed. The Arado Ar 80, with its gull wing (replaced with a straight, tapered wing on the V3) and fixed, spatted undercarriage was overweight and underpowered and the structure was abandoned after three prototypes had been built. The parasol winged Fw 159 was always considered by the Erprobungsstelle (E-Stelle) staff at Travemünde to be a compromise between the biplane and the aerodynamically more efficient low-wing monoplane. Although it had some advanced features, it used a novel undercarriage pattern which was never truly reliable.Initially, the Bf 109 was regarded with suspicion by the E-Stelle test pilots because of its steep ground angle, resulting in poor forward view on the ground; the sideways-hinged cockpit canopy, which could not be opened in flight; and the automatic wing leading edge slots which, it was thought, would inadvertently open during aerobatics, possibly leading to crashes. They were also concerned about the high wing loading.The Heinkel He 112, based on a scaled-down Blitz was the favorite of the Luftwaffe leaders.
Compared with the Bf 109, it was also cheaper. Positive aspects of the He 112 included the wide track and robustness of the undercarriage, considerably better visibility from the cockpit, and a lower wing loading that led to easier landings. However, the He 112 was also structurally complicated, being some 18% heavier than the Bf 109, and it soon became clear that the thick wing, which spanned 12.6 m (41 ft 4 in) with an area of 23.2 m2 (249.7 ft2) on the first prototype (V1), was a disadvantage for a light fighter plane, decreasing the aircraft's rate of roll and maneuverability. Because of its smaller, lighter airframe, the Bf 109 was 30 km/h (20 mph) faster than the He 112 in level flight, and superior in climbing and diving. As a result, the He 112 V4 which was used for the trials had recent wings, spanning 11.5 m (37 ft 8.75 in) with an area of 21.6 m2 (232.5 ft2). In addition, the V4 had a single-piece, clear-view, sliding cockpit canopy and a more powerful Jumo 210Da engine with a modified exhaust system. However, the improvements had not been fully tested and the He 112 V4 could not be demonstrated in accordance with the rules laid down by the Acceptance Commission, giving a distinct advantage to the Bf 109. The Commission ruled in favour of the Bf 109 because of the Messerschmitt test pilot's demonstration of the 109's capabilities during a series of spins, dives, flick rolls and tight turns, throughout which the pilot was in complete control of the aircraft.
Stuka and the Blitzkrieg
During World War II, the Germans Wehrmacht applied the use of not only their vaunted Panzers but also, the Ju 87 Stuka Dive Bomber immensely. The term "Blitzkrieg" is used to refer to a specific military strategy that the Germans include, which is to use speed and power to obtain a decisive victory. There is much debate over the originality of this military strategy. Eventually, historians agree that the method is not a new one. It is an old method that is used with new technology.During World War Two, densely armored vehicle technology was maturing quickly. Tanks and planes often help in achieving speedy victories. The Junkers Stuka gained recognition because of its ability to execute ground attacks. It was feared by many and can be easily recognized due to its inverted gull wing design.As a ground attack plane, the airplane was highly useful. The new pattern helped the pilot to execute dives quickly and effectively. The airplane was able to recover from the dive due to automatic pull-up brakes that were installed underneath both wings. Its greatest strength was its accuracy. In fact, the Stuka dive bomber remained as one of the most accurate ground attack plane throughout the entire World War 2. Even though it had some weaknesses, it was applied up to the last days of the war.The plane was mostly used for precision ground attacks on enemy targets. Its sturdiness and stable speed made the plane ideal for attacking slow ground targets such as assault boats flak cannons, armored convoys and tanks.However, its greatest strength also became its greatest weakness. These weaknesses were exposed in the sky. Modern fighter planes could easily take this plane out as they could out maneuver and outrun the Ju 87 Stuka. As a result, the Ju 87 rarely proceed on missions without fighter escorts. Without the escorts, the Ju 87 could be easily taken out.Although the plane was sturdy and reliable, it had poor maneuverability when in the air. In addition, the speed was slow when compared to modern fighter plane. Any enemy plane could have intercepted the planes and cause the attacks to fail.But due to its ground accuracy, the Stuka planes continued to carry out Blitzkrieg missions. One can only imagine the fear that those on the ground feel when they hear the loud siren of the Ju 87 planes. The planes made no attempt to conceal themselves. The Germans knew what the airplane were capable of.Blitzkrieg missions meant that the attacks were carried out with force, speed and precision. Without the awesome fire power of the Ju 87 Stuka, such attacks would be hard to carry out.
The Battle of Britain (German: Luftschlacht um England or Luftschlacht um Großbritannien) is the name given to the air war waged by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) against the United Kingdom during the summer and autumn of 1940. The target of the campaign was to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), especially Fighter Command. The name derives from a famous speech delivered by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons: "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin..." The Battle of Britain was the first important campaign to be fought entirely by air forces, and was also the largest and most sustained aerial bombing warto that date. From July 1940 coastal shipping convoys and shipping centers, such as Portsmouth, were the main targets; one month later the Luftwaffe shifted its attacks to RAF airfields and infrastructure. As the combat progressed the Luftwaffe also targeted aircraft factories and ground infrastructure. Eventually the Luftwaffe resorted to attacking areas of political significance and using terror bombing tactics. The fault of Germany to achieve its objectives of destroying Britain's air defenses, or forcing Britain to negotiate an armistice or an outright surrender, is considered its first major defeat and one of the paramount turning points in the war. If Germany had gained air superiority with the Luftwaffe, Adolf Hitler might have launched Operation Sea Lion, an amphibious and airborne invasion of Britain. The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Messerschmitt Bf 110C squared off against the RAF's workhorse Hurricane Mk I and the less numerous Spitfire Mk I. The Bf 109E had a better climb rate and was 10 to 30 mph faster than the Hurricane, depending on altitude. In September 1940 the more powerful Mk IIa series 1 Hurricanes started entering service although only in small numbers. This version was capable of a maximum speed of 342 mph, some 25 to 30 mph faster than the Mk I. The operation of the Spitfire over Dunkirk came as a surprise to the Jagdwaffe, although the German pilots retained a strong belief that the 109 was the superior fighter. However, the Bf 109E had a much larger turning circle than either the Hurricane or the Spitfire. The two British fighters were equipped with eight Browning 303 machine guns, while most Bf 109Es had two machine guns and two wing cannons. The Messerschmitt Bf 109E and the Spitfire were superior to each other in key areas; for instance, at some altitudes, the Bf 109 could out-climb the British fighter. In general, though, as Alfred Price noted in The Spitfire Story: ...the differences between the Spitfire and the Me 109 in performance and handling were only marginal, and in a combat they were almost always surmounted by tactical considerations: which side had seen the other first, had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining. The Bf 109 was also used as a fighter-bomber—the E-4/B and E-7 models could carry a 250 kg bomb below the fuselage. The Messerschmitt Bf 109, unlike the Stuka, could fight on equal terms with RAF fighters after releasing its ordnance. At the start of the combat, the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range Zerstörer ("Destroyer") was also expected to engage in air-to-air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. Although the Messerschmitt 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as the Spitfire, its lack of maneuverability and acceleration meant that it was a failure as a long-range escort fighter. On 13 and 15 August, 13 and 30 aircraft were lost, the equivalent of an entire Gruppe, and the type's worst losses during the action. This trend continued with a further eight and 15 lost on 16 and 17 August. Göring ordered the Bf 110 units to operate "where the range of the single-engined machines were not sufficient". The most productive role of the Messerschmitt Bf 110 during the battle was as a Schnellbomber (fast bomber). The Bf 110 usually used a shallow dive to bomb the target and escaped at high speed.One unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210, proved that the Messerschmitt Bf 110 could be used to good effect in attacking small or "pinpoint" targets. The RAF's Boulton Paul Defiant had some initial success over Dunkirk because of its resemblance to the Hurricane; Luftwaffe fighters attacking from the rear were surprised by its unusual gun turret. However, during the Battle of Britain, this single-engine two-seater proved to be hopelessly outclassed. For various reasons, the Defiant lacked any form of forward firing armament and the heavy turret meant that it could not out-run or out-maneuver either the Bf 109 or the Bf 110. By the end of August, after disastrous losses, the aircraft was withdrawn from daylight service. There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these aircraft (along with the Fairey Battles in RAF Bomber Command) operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlin engines to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.The Luftwaffe's four primary bombers were the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, and Junkers Ju 88 for level bombing, and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka for diving attacks. The Heinkel He 111 was used in greater numbers than the others during the conflict and is better known, partly due to its distinctive wing shape. Each level bomber also had a few reconnaissance versions that were used during the battle. Although successful in previous Luftwaffe engagements, the Stuka suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Britain, particularly on 18 August, due to its slow speed and vulnerability to Spitfire fighter interception after the dive bombing. As a result of the losses and limited payload and range, Ju87 Stuka units were largely removed from operations over England and concentrated on shipping instead until they were re-deployed to the Eastern Front in 1941. The Ju87 Stuka dive bombers returned on occasion, such as on the 13 September attack on Tangmere airfield. The remaining three bomber types differed in their capabilities; the Heinkel 111 was the slowest, the Ju 88, once its mainly externally carried bomb load was dropped, was the fastest, and the Do 17 had the smallest bomb load. All three bomber types suffered heavy losses from British fighters, but the Ju 88 disproportionately so. Later in the conflict, when night bombing became more frequent, all three were used. However, due to its reduced bomb load, the lighter Do 17 was used less than the He 111 and Ju 88 for this purpose. On the British side, three bombers were mostly used on night operations against targets such as factories, invasion ports and railway centers; the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, the Handley-Page Hampden and the Vickers Wellington were classified as heavy bombers by the RAF, although the Hampden was a medium bomber comparable to the He 111. The twin-engined Bristol Blenheim and the obsolescent single-engined Fairey Battle were both light bombers; the Blenheim was the most numerous of the aircraft equipping RAF Bomber Command and was used in attacks against shipping, ports, airfields and factories on the continent by day and by night, while the Battle was rarely used on operations. Before the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude. By summer 1940, there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF for approximately 5,000 aircraft, most of which were bombers. However, the problem of pilot shortage was self-inflicted, due to inefficiencies in training and assignment. With aircraft production running at 300 each week, only 200 pilots were trained in the same period. In addition, more pilots were allotted to squadrons than there were aircraft. Another problem was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada and in Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were assigned to staff positions, since RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the front line from administrative duties. For these reasons, the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of qualified pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of aircraft, that became the greatest concern for Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Commander of Fighter Command. Drawing from regular RAF forces and the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots, with little flight training and often no gunnery training, suffered high casualty rates. Due mostly to more productive training, the Luftwaffe could muster a larger number (1,450) of more experienced fighter pilots. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery and instructions in tactics suited for fighter-versus-fighter combat. Luftwaffe training manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favor.
|